I’m not ordinarily the suspicious type, but somehow I suspect that there’s more to your question than simple intellectual curiosity. I’ll get to that below. But first, let me summarize the not-so-simple stance of Jewish law (halakhah).
The Torah prescribes a clear line of inheritance (Numbers 27:8-11; Deuteronomy 21:17): one’s property is inherited by one’s sons, with the father’s first-born son receiving a portion twice as large as that of any of his brothers. A daughter inherits if and only if there are no living sons and no living descendants from those sons. These rules, derived directly from Scripture, are considered iron-clad; if one writes a will that changes or departs from the Torah’s order of inheritance, that will is of no force under Jewish law. On the other hand, one is permitted to make gifts of money and property to anybody prior to one’s death. In theory, then, those who do not wish to leave property to their children can simply arrange to give all or most of their estate to others. As long as their gift takes force before they die, it is considered legally valid …
… but that doesn’t necessarily make it morally proper. The Rabbis (M. Bava Batra 8:5; B. Bava Batra 133b; B. Ketubot 53a) declare that though one is empowered to give away his property and leave nothing to his legal heirs, “the Sages are displeased with his act.” This is true even though his sons “do not behave in a proper manner.” The stated reason for the Rabbis’ disapproval is that, even if a son turns out to be a no-goodnik, one can never be sure that the son will not beget any fine and upstanding descendants who would be denied their rightful inheritance thereby. Thus, it is best to stick with the Torah’s order of inheritance. That, at any rate, is the rule as codified by the major authorities (Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, Hilkht Nachalot 6:11; Shulchan Arukh Choshen Mishpat 282). There the matter would stand, except for the fact that some contemporary Orthodox authorities have derived exceptions to this rule. For example, when one son is a Torah scholar and the other is non-observant, these authorities rule that it is proper for the father to transfer all his wealth to the Torah scholar.
What can we learn from all of this? For one thing, it isn’t too difficult to find fault with the rules as I’ve described them. Many of us, myself included, find the exclusion of daughters from inheritance to be morally indefensible in this day and age. But one lesson that does come forth is that the Jewish law of inheritance struggles over the question you have posed. On the one hand, it empowers a parent to cut children out of their legal inheritance; on the other hand, it strongly disapproves of parents who do this; and on the other hand (and yes, in Jewish discussions, we sometimes have three hands!), it recognizes that there may be exceptions to this rule, cases in which it would be a bad idea to bequeath a significant amount of money to a child who for some reason is not worthy of it. The halakhah struggles back and forth over this question because, well, it’s a difficult question. Human relations are complex things, and sometimes that complexity does not permit of a simple answer.
Now back to my suspicion: it sounds as though you are struggling over this issue in your life. Perhaps you are wondering whether one or more of your children are deserving of a significant portion of their legal inheritance. As you can tell from the above, I have no easy answers for you. What I can say is that, as a general principle, Jewish tradition discourages us from disinheriting our children, even when we think that such an action is for their own good. Cutting them out, even for the best reasons, is the sort of punitive action that is likely to bear poisonous fruit for years, maybe generations to come. It is far better to work out our disagreements with our children before we die, if that is at all possible. If you can’t see your way to allowing your child(ren) to inherit, one possible course is to set up a trust fund with strict rules that permit the disbursement of funds for purposes of which you approve and under conditions – hopefully reasonable ones – that you set. Our tradition would permit that course of action, if only as a last resort.
For a more complete discussion, see Reform Responsa for the 21st Century (New York: CCar Press, 2010), volume 2, pp. 359-364.